Flintkote Co v. Aviva PLC by unknown
2014 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
10-9-2014 
Flintkote Co v. Aviva PLC 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2014 
Recommended Citation 
"Flintkote Co v. Aviva PLC" (2014). 2014 Decisions. 1061. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2014/1061 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2014 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________ 
 
No. 13-4055 
______________ 
 
FLINTKOTE COMPANY 
 
v. 
 
AVIVA PLC,  
formerly known as Commercial Union Assurance Company 
Ltd., 
    Appellant 
______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware 
(D.C. Civ. No. 13-cv-00103) 
District Judge: Hon. Leonard P. Stark 
______________ 
 
Argued July 8, 2014 
______________ 
 
Before: SMITH, VANASKIE, and SHWARTZ, Circuit 
Judges. 
 
(Filed:  October 9, 2014) 
 
2 
 
Fred L. Alvarez, Esq. [ARGUED] 
Arthur J. McColgan, Esq. 
Walker Wilcox Matousek 
One North Franklin Street 
Suite 3200 
Chicago, IL 60606 
 
Thaddeus J. Weaver, Esq. 
Dilworth Paxson 
704 King Street, Suite 500 
P.O. Box 1031 
Wilmington, DE 19801 
  Counsel for Appellant 
 
Louis A. Chiafullo, Esq.  [ARGUED] 
Gita F. Rothschild, Esq. 
McCarter & English 
100 Mulberry Street 
Four Gateway Center, 14th Floor 
Newark, NJ 07102 
 
Michael P. Kelly, Esq. 
Katharine L. Mayer, Esq.  
McCarter & English, LLP 
Renaissance Centre 
405 N. King Street, 8th Floor 
Wilmington, DE 19801 
  Counsel for Appellee 
______________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
______________ 
3 
 
 
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge. 
 This case involves an effort by Appellee The Flintkote 
Company (Flintkote) to compel arbitration on a theory of 
equitable estoppel against Appellant Aviva PLC (Aviva), a 
non-signatory to the agreement containing the arbitration 
clause at issue.  Aviva appeals the District Court’s order 
compelling arbitration and denying as moot Aviva’s motion 
to dismiss or transfer.  Applying Delaware law, we conclude 
that Aviva is not equitably bound to arbitrate on these facts.  
We will therefore reverse the District Court’s order insofar as 
it compels arbitration, and will vacate the order to the extent 
that it denies as moot the motion to dismiss or transfer. 
I.  
Flintkote, which is incorporated in Delaware and 
headquartered in California, was one of the nation’s major 
suppliers of asbestos-based products.  From 1980 onward, 
Flintkote’s parent company, Genstar Corporation, hedged 
against the possibility of asbestos-related bodily injury claims 
by procuring a vast number of insurance policies from 
prominent London insurance firms—among them Aviva,1 one 
of the largest insurance companies in the world.  Within a 
matter of years, it became apparent that Flintkote’s claims 
under these policies would result in costly and protracted 
disputes regarding the scope of coverage. 
                                              
1
 Aviva was formerly named Commercial Union 
Assurance Company Ltd. 
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On June 19, 1985, Flintkote and several of the London 
insurers, but not Aviva, entered into a mass settlement known 
as the Wellington Agreement, which provided a structure for 
resolution of Flintkote’s then-pending and future insurance 
claims.  Specifically, the Wellington Agreement required that 
disputes over coverage be resolved through a three-step ADR 
process consisting of open negotiation via mediation, binding 
arbitration, and an expedited appellate process.  (App. 104.)  
Section XX of the Agreement required the London insurers to 
make certain payments to Flintkote, and Flintkote was 
obligated to reimburse the payors, with interest, if it also 
received those same payments from another insurer.  (App. 
89–90.) 
In 1989, Flintkote and Aviva entered into a separate 
agreement (the 1989 Agreement), which in substance was 
largely similar to the Wellington Agreement, including as to 
reimbursement for claims also paid by other insurers.  Crucial 
to this case, however, is the fact that the 1989 Agreement 
contained a clause explicitly reserving each party’s right to 
resolve any disputes arising under that Agreement through 
litigation: 
Flintkote and [Aviva] shall 
resolve through litigation any 
disputed issues to this Agreement, 
and nothing contained in any 
provision of this Agreement or in 
any provision of the Wellington 
Agreement, as applied to this 
Agreement, shall require [Aviva] 
and Flintkote to resolve any 
disputes that may arise between 
them relating to this Agreement 
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through ADR under the 
Wellington Agreement. 
(App. 137.) 
Flintkote filed for bankruptcy in 2004, resulting in a 
case which remains pending in the United States Bankruptcy 
Court for the District of Delaware.  See In re The Flintkote 
Co. & Flintkote Mines, Ltd., No. 04-11300 (Bankr. D. Del.).  
In 2006, invoking the Wellington Agreement, Flintkote 
initiated a large-scale coverage-related mediation with the 
London insurers.  The Mediation Agreement, which itself 
contained no reference to the Wellington Agreement, 
provided that the parties’ conduct and statements made in the 
course of mediation were to be confidential.
2
  (App. 438–39.)  
                                              
2
 Specifically, the Mediation Agreement stated: 
All offers, promises, conduct, and 
statements, whether oral or 
written, made in the course of the 
mediation by the parties, their 
agents, employees, experts and 
attorneys, and the mediator are 
confidential.  Such offers, 
promises, conduct, and statements 
will not be disclosed to third 
parties, except persons associated 
with the parties in the mediation 
process and persons or entities to 
whom a party has a legal or 
contractual obligation to report, 
and are privileged and 
inadmissible for any purpose . . . . 
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Aviva, although not contractually obligated to participate, 
opted to join the mediation in an effort to resolve Flintkote’s 
pending claims for coverage. 
Throughout the subsequent proceedings, Aviva and the 
other London insurers were jointly represented by the same 
counsel, Attorney Fred Alvarez.  In a letter dated August 4, 
2006, Alvarez requested that Flintkote “participat[e] in 
submitting a joint motion to lift the automatic bankruptcy stay 
in Flintkote’s bankruptcy proceeding,” citing a concern that 
the stay might prevent Aviva and the other London insurers 
from “fully present[ing] their defenses and claims in the 
Wellington ADR.”  (App. 149.)  Yet for reasons unknown, no 
such motion was filed at that time.  As described below, the 
automatic stay remained in place until early 2013. 
During the course of the ensuing mediation, Flintkote 
reached individual settlements with some of the London 
insurers, but not with Aviva.  On July 16, 2012, counsel for 
Aviva and the remaining other London insurers wrote to 
Flintkote seeking “reimbursement or off-set with respect to 
prior payments” as well as interest under Section XX of the 
Wellington Agreement.  (App. 153.)  The July 16 letter 
further stated that “[a]bsent resolution of the issues in the 
pending Wellington ADR, [the London insurers] intend[ed] to 
include the [reimbursement] issue[] in the Wellington 
Arbitration.”  (Id.)  Flintkote took no action on the demand. 
Two months after the July 16 letter, the parties began 
to exchange draft arbitration agreements. The drafts contained 
                                                                                                     
(App. 438.) 
7 
 
standard reservations stating that they were provided only for 
“discussion purposes,” were subject to client review and 
approval, and were provided “without prejudice” to the 
parties’ rights under the applicable accords.  (App. 444–47).  
The last draft arbitration agreement was sent to Flintkote by 
Alvarez on behalf of Aviva and the London insurers on 
December 14, 2012. 
On December 24, 2012, Aviva, now acting separately 
from the remaining London insurers, moved in the Delaware 
Bankruptcy Court to lift the automatic stay imposed under 11 
U.S.C. § 362(d) “to allow it to pursue a declaratory judgment 
action in the United States District Court for the Northern 
District of California to determine the scope of the insurance 
coverage available for [Flintkote] under certain insurance 
policies” Aviva had issued.  (App. 321.)  On January 17, 
2013, before the Bankruptcy Court ruled on Aviva’s motion, 
Flintkote filed the instant declaratory judgment action against 
Aviva in the District of Delaware. 
On February 4, the Bankruptcy Court granted Aviva’s 
motion to lift the stay, but delayed its effective date until 
February 19, thus preventing Aviva from filing its complaint 
in California until that date.  On February 18, as plaintiff in 
the District of Delaware, Flintkote moved to compel 
arbitration pursuant to Section 4 of the Federal Arbitration 
Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. § 4.  The next day, Aviva filed its own 
declaratory judgment action in the Northern District of 
California.   
On March 1, Aviva moved to dismiss Flintkote’s 
action or transfer it to California.  On March 13, Flintkote 
filed a motion to dismiss the Aviva action initiated in 
California, or have it transferred to Delaware.  On May 14, 
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the California court stayed Aviva’s action pending the 
Delaware court’s resolution of Aviva’s motion to dismiss or 
transfer Flintkote’s action. 
In a memorandum and order filed September 30, 2013, 
the Delaware District Court granted Flintkote’s motion to 
compel arbitration, concluding that Aviva was equitably 
estopped from avoiding arbitration by virtue of its 
participation in the lengthy mediation process.  The District 
Court denied as moot Aviva’s motion to dismiss or transfer.  
Aviva filed a timely notice of appeal.  On November 21, 
2013, in light of the Delaware District Court’s order 
compelling arbitration, the California District Court dismissed 
Aviva’s suit without prejudice.  See Aviva PLC v. Flintkote 
Co., No. 13-00711, 2013 WL 6139748 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 
2013). 
II.  
The District Court had jurisdiction in this case under 
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) and 9 U.S.C. § 4.  We have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(3).   
We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s 
order on a motion to compel arbitration.  Quilloin v. Tenet 
Healthsystem Phila., Inc., 673 F.3d 221, 228 (3d Cir. 2012).  
In assessing the motion to compel arbitration itself, we apply 
the standard for summary judgment in Rule 56(a), under 
which the motion should be granted where “there is no 
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56(a).  We view the facts and draw inferences in the light 
most favorable to the nonmoving party.  Quilloin, 673 F.3d at 
228.  We apply this standard “because the district court’s 
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order compelling arbitration is in effect a summary 
disposition of the issue of whether or not there had been a 
meeting of the minds on the agreement to arbitrate.”  Century 
Indem. Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 584 
F.3d 513, 528 (3d Cir. 2009) (quotation marks and citations 
omitted). 
III.  
With its enactment of the FAA, Congress “expressed a 
strong federal policy in favor of resolving disputes through 
arbitration.”  Id. at 522.  Even in light of the FAA, however, 
we have recognized that “[a]rbitration is strictly a matter of 
contract.  If a party has not agreed to arbitrate, the courts have 
no authority to mandate that he do so.”  Bel-Ray Co., Inc. v. 
Chemrite (Pty) Ltd., 181 F.3d 435, 444 (3d Cir. 1999).  Thus, 
in deciding whether a party may be compelled to arbitrate 
under the FAA, we first consider “(1) whether there is a valid 
agreement to arbitrate between the parties and, if so, (2) 
whether the merits-based dispute in question falls within the 
scope of that valid agreement.”3  Century Indem., 584 F.3d at 
527.  Here, it is undisputed that no express agreement to 
arbitrate existed between Flintkote and Aviva. 
Instead, Flintkote relies upon our recurring admonition 
that a party, despite being a non-signatory to an arbitration 
agreement, may be equitably bound to arbitrate “under 
traditional principles of contract and agency law.”  E.I. 
                                              
3
 Although a presumption in favor of arbitration exists, 
that presumption applies only when interpreting the scope of 
an arbitration agreement, and not when deciding whether a 
valid agreement exists.  Century Indem., 584 F.3d at 527. 
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DuPont De Nemours & Co. v. Rhone Poulenc Fiber & Resin 
Intermediates, S.A.S., 269 F.3d 187, 194–95 (3d Cir. 2001).  
Such principles, which by the Supreme Court’s recent 
measure include “assumption, piercing the corporate veil, 
alter ego, incorporation by reference, third-party beneficiary 
theories, waiver and estoppel,” Arthur Andersen LLP v. 
Carlisle, 556 U.S. 624, 631 (2009) (quotation marks omitted), 
all are founded on the notion that a contract may sometimes 
be equitably enforced by or against even nonparties.  In the 
wake of Arthur Andersen, however, we must expressly 
consider “whether the relevant state contract law recognizes 
[the particular principle] as a ground for enforcing contracts 
against third parties.”  Id. at 632.  
Neither the District Court’s opinion in this case nor the 
parties’ briefing addresses with particularity which state’s law 
governs Flintkote’s motion to compel arbitration.4   At 
various times throughout their briefing on Flintkote’s motion, 
however, both parties cite to either Delaware case law or 
federal opinions interpreting Delaware law.  (See Appellant’s 
Br. at 22, 33–34; Appellee’s Br. at 23–24, 34; Appellant’s 
Reply Br. at 8; App. 65, 426, 558.)  And the District Court 
ultimately concluded that Aviva was equitably bound to 
arbitrate under two distinct theories of estoppel, both of 
which arise under Delaware law: first, that Aviva “exploited” 
the Wellington agreement to secure benefits to which it would 
otherwise not have been entitled, E.I. DuPont, 269 F.3d at 
199 (addressing a diversity case implicating Delaware law); 
                                              
4
 We recognize that the parties are at odds as to 
whether the substance of the underlying insurance dispute 
should be decided under California or Delaware law, and we 
take no position on that question.  
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and second, that Aviva’s participation in mediation caused 
Flintkote to “change [its] position to [its] detriment[,]” Great 
Am. Credit Corp. v. Wilmington Hous. Auth., 680 F. Supp. 
131, 134 (D. Del. 1988) (quotation marks and citations 
omitted) (applying Delaware law).  (App. 12–14.)  For these 
reasons, and because neither party presented a timely 
argument that Flintkote’s motion is governed by the law of 
any jurisdiction other than the forum state, we too will apply 
the law of Delaware.
5
 
                                              
5
 Aviva suggested for the first time at oral argument 
that California law applies to the equitable estoppel analysis.  
Because Aviva did not make that argument in its briefing or 
before the District Court, we consider it waived.  See 
Griswold v. Coventry First LLC, 762 F.3d 264, 272 n.6 (3d 
Cir. 2014) (noting that a “footnote in [a] reply brief” was 
“insufficient to raise a choice-of-law issue on appeal”). 
In the alternative, we note that California law is 
materially similar to Delaware law on the basic principles of 
equitable estoppel.  See Steinhart v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 47 
Cal. 4th 1298, 1315 (Cal. 2010) (recognizing doctrine of 
equitable estoppel); NAMA Holdings, LLC v. Related World 
Mkt. Ctr., 922 A.2d 417, 431–33 (Del. Ch. 2007) (same); 
Goldman v. KPMG LLP, 173 Cal. App. 4th 209 (Cal. App. 
Ct. 2009) (compelling arbitration on the basis of equitable 
estoppel); Wilcox & Fetzer, Ltd. v. Corbett & Wilcox, No. 
2037-N, 2006 WL 2473665, *4–6 (Del. Ch. Aug. 22, 2006) 
(same); In re Marriage of Brinkman, 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d 722, 728 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (requiring proof of equitable estoppel by 
clear and convincing evidence); Emp’rs’ Liab. Assurance 
Corp. v. Madric, 183 A.2d 182, 188 (Del. 1962) (same).  
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Delaware law recognizes the doctrine of equitable 
estoppel, see NAMA Holdings, LLC v. Related World Mkt. 
Ctr., 922 A.2d 417, 431–33 (Del. Ch. 2007), and imposes the 
burden of producing clear and convincing proof on the party 
asserting estoppel, see Emp’rs’ Liab. Assurance Corp. v. 
Madric, 183 A.2d 182, 188 (Del. 1962).  “An estoppel may 
not rest upon an inference that is merely one of several 
possible inferences.”  Id.   We now consider Aviva’s 
argument that Flintkote failed to justify application of 
equitable estoppel by clear and convincing evidence. 
A.  
As noted above, the first basis for the District Court’s 
opinion was what we have termed the “knowing exploitation” 
theory of equitable estoppel.  We first addressed that principle 
in E.I. DuPont, where, drawing on the opinions of other 
federal circuits, we explained that a non-signatory is equitably 
precluded from “embracing a contract, and then turning its 
back on the portions of the contract, such as an arbitration 
clause, that it finds distasteful.”  269 F.3d at 200.6 
                                                                                                     
Thus, seeing no appreciable conflict of laws, we opt to apply 
the law of Delaware. 
6
 Delaware courts have since cited that portion of the 
E.I. DuPont opinion favorably on several occasions.  See, 
e.g., Aveta Inc. v. Cavallieri, 23 A.3d 157, 182 (Del. Ch. 
2010); NAMA Holdings, 922 A.2d at 430–32 & nn.25–27, 35; 
Trenwick Am. Litig. Trust v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P., 906 A.2d 
168, 218 n.155 (Del. Ch. 2006).  We thus have no concern 
that our continuing validation of E.I. DuPont constitutes an 
13 
 
Delaware courts have identified several circumstances 
under which a non-signatory may “embrace” a contract: (1) 
where the non-signatory “direct[ly], rather than indirect[ly], 
benefit[ted] from the [agreement] during the course of the 
agreement’s performance[,]”  NAMA Holdings, 922 A.2d at 
432; (2) where the non-signatory “‘consistently maintain[s] 
that other provisions of the same contract should be enforced 
to benefit him[,]’” Aveta Inc., 23 A.3d at 182 (quoting E.I. 
DuPont, 269 F.3d at 200); or (3) where the non-signatory 
“‘sue[s] to enforce the provisions of a contract that it likes, 
while simultaneously disclaiming the provisions that it does 
not[,]’” id. (quoting Town of Smyrna v. Kent Cnty. Levy 
Court, No. 244-K, 2004 WL 2671745, at *4 (Del. Ch. Nov. 9, 
2004)).
7
  Even so, a court must “proceed with a good deal of 
                                                                                                     
application of federal common law which would be precluded 
under Arthur Andersen.  See Griswold, 762 F.3d at 272 n.6 
(“Because we are satisfied that the Supreme Court's decision 
in Arthur Andersen did not overrule Third Circuit decisions 
consistent with relevant state law contract principles, we may 
rely on our prior decisions so long as they do not conflict with 
[the applicable] state law principles.”). 
7
 One might argue that we announced a more 
restrictive rule in Bouriez v. Carnegie Mellon University, 359 
F.3d 292, 295 (3d Cir. 2004), when we stated that “[a] person 
may also be equitably estopped from challenging an 
agreement that includes an arbitration clause when that 
person embraces the agreement and directly benefits from it.”  
(emphasis added) (citing E.I. DuPont, 269 F.3d at 199–200).  
But Bouriez has never been cited approvingly by a Delaware 
court, and in any event did not purport to apply Delaware law.  
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caution . . . lest nuanced concepts of equity be allowed to 
override established legal principles of contract formation.”  
NAMA Holdings, 922 A.2d at 433 n.35. 
Our review of the record leads us to conclude that 
Flintkote has failed to adduce clear and convincing evidence 
that Aviva “embraced” the Wellington Agreement in any 
meaningful sense.  First, the mediation in which Aviva 
participated was governed not by the Wellington Agreement, 
but by the Mediation Agreement—a document which (1) 
made no reference to the Wellington Agreement, (2) 
contained no arbitration provision, and (3) was structured on 
its own terms as a completely confidential procedure.  To 
participate in the mediation, Aviva was not required to sign 
the Wellington Agreement or forfeit any rights under the 
1989 Agreement.  In sum, there is simply no evidence that 
Aviva embraced the Wellington Agreement when it opted to 
participate in mediation alongside the other London insurers.
8
 
                                                                                                     
Thus, in light of Arthur Andersen, we will not consider it 
here. 
8
 Flintkote argues that were it not for the Wellington 
Agreement, the mediation at issue would simply never have 
occurred, thus precluding Aviva from delaying the resolution 
of Flintkote’s insurance claims against it.  To the extent that 
this can be considered a “benefit” at all, we consider it to be 
of the “indirect” sort that provides no basis for equitable 
estoppel.  See NAMA Holdings, 922 A.2d at 432 (citing 
Thomson-CSF, S.A. v. Am. Arbitration Ass’n, 64 F.3d 773, 
779 (2d Cir. 1995)). 
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 Second, we do not view the July 16 letter that Attorney 
Alvarez sent Flintkote, in which he noted an ostensible right 
to reimbursement under Section XX of the Wellington 
Agreement, as a basis for application of equitable estoppel.  
(App. 153.)  This single invocation of the Wellington 
Agreement, which appears to be an isolated event in the six-
year course of the mediation at issue, did not result in any 
direct benefit to Aviva.  The request likewise falls well short 
of “consistently” seeking the benefit of “other provisions of 
the same contract[,]” or actually suing to enforce that clause.  
See Aveta Inc., 23 A.3d at 182.  As a final point, we note that 
Aviva was entitled to reimbursement and interest under a 
similar provision in the 1989 Agreement, meaning that any 
reimbursement ultimately obtained by Aviva would have 
stemmed primarily, if not entirely, from the 1989 Agreement, 
not the Wellington Agreement. 
Finally, Flintkote attempts to justify the District 
Court’s holding by noting the August 4, 2006 letter in which 
Attorney Alvarez requested that Flintkote join in filing a 
motion to lift the Bankruptcy Court’s automatic stay.  (App. 
149.)  No such joint motion was ever filed, and the automatic 
stay remained in place until being lifted, over Flintkote’s 
objection, to allow Aviva to file suit in the Northern District 
of California over six years later.  Because the request in the 
August 4, 2006 letter was not an attempt to invoke any right 
under the Wellington Agreement, and because Aviva 
ultimately received no direct benefit as a result of the August 
4, 2006 letter, we conclude that it does not provide a basis for 
equitable estoppel. 
In sum, the record does not contain clear and 
convincing evidence that Aviva “embraced” the Wellington 
Agreement by directly benefitting from that Agreement, 
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consistently seeking to enforce that Agreement’s provisions 
for Aviva’s benefit, or suing to enforce rights ostensibly 
arising under that Agreement.  The District Court thus erred 
in granting Flintkote’s motion to compel arbitration on this 
basis.   
B.  
Delaware courts have also recognized that the doctrine 
of equitable estoppel may apply “when a party by his conduct 
intentionally or unintentionally leads another, in reliance 
upon that conduct, to change position to his detriment.”  
Wilson v. Am. Ins. Co., 209 A.2d 902, 903–04 (Del. 1965).  
“The party claiming estoppel must demonstrate that: (i) they 
lacked knowledge or the means of obtaining knowledge of the 
truth of the facts in question; (ii) they reasonably relied on the 
conduct of the party against whom estoppel is claimed; and 
(iii) they suffered a prejudicial change of position as a result 
of their reliance.”  Nevins v. Bryan, 885 A.2d 233, 249 (Del. 
Ch. 2005). 
Here, the District Court found that Flintkote had 
reasonably relied on Aviva’s participation in the mediation 
process as an assurance that Aviva had disclaimed its right to 
litigation under the 1989 Agreement and instead consented to 
participation in the Wellington process, up to and including 
binding arbitration.  This purportedly operated to Flintkote’s 
detriment by delaying resolution of the underlying insurance 
claims at issue. 
Even assuming that such delay might constitute a 
detriment under the circumstances, we conclude that Flintkote 
has still failed to establish two of the three factors described 
in Nevins.  First, given that Flintkote was a signatory to the 
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1989 Agreement, which contained an express litigation 
provision, Flintkote was on actual notice of “the truth of the 
facts in question,” i.e., that Aviva had negotiated for and 
specifically reserved the right to resolve all disputed issues 
through litigation.  Cf. Great Am. Credit Corp., 680 F. Supp. 
at 134, 138 (declining to apply equitable estoppel where a 
contractor should have known of a statutory provision 
precluding payment to it if it failed to pay its subcontractors).  
Second, to the extent that Flintkote relied on Aviva’s 
participation in mediation as an unspoken waiver of its rights 
under the 1989 Agreement, such reliance was unreasonable.  
The Mediation Agreement contains no language to suggest 
that it displaced the 1989 Agreement’s litigation provision, 
makes no reference to the Wellington Agreement, and does 
not contemplate a resort to arbitration in the event of failure 
to reach a negotiated disposition.  Flintkote’s mistaken 
assumption to the contrary could have been clarified with 
even a cursory inquiry at any point during the six-year 
mediation, and thus provides no basis for equitable estoppel.
9
 
For these reasons, Flintkote could not have reasonably 
relied on Aviva’s participation in mediation as a basis to 
believe binding arbitration would occur if the mediation 
failed.  We therefore conclude that the District Court erred in 
applying equitable estoppel under a theory of detrimental 
reliance to compel Aviva to arbitrate. 
                                              
9
 For the reasons already described in Part III.A, we 
attribute little significance to Aviva’s July 16 letter 
identifying issues that might be raised in arbitration.  
Similarly, the draft arbitration agreements exchanged by the 
parties contained disclaimers that they were for discussion 
purposes only. 
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IV.  
Finally, we find no merit in Flintkote’s auxiliary 
arguments based on waiver and implied-in-fact contract.  
Under Delaware law, “the standards for demonstrating 
waiver—the voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a 
known right—are quite exacting.”  Amirsaleh v. Bd. of Trade 
of City of N.Y., Inc., 27 A.3d 522, 529 (Del. 2011) (quotation 
marks and citations omitted).  As explained earlier, we see no 
conduct on Aviva’s part that, to a reasonable observer, would 
have conveyed an intent to waive or otherwise forgo its rights 
under the 1989 Agreement.  And it is hornbook common law 
that courts will not infer an implied-in-fact contract where an 
express contractual provision already exists on the same 
point, as it does here under the 1989 Agreement.  See 
Williston on Contracts, § 1:5. 
V.  
 Because we will reverse the District Court’s order to 
the extent that it granted Flintkote’s motion to compel 
arbitration, Aviva’s motion to dismiss or transfer is no longer 
moot.  We will therefore vacate the District Court’s order 
insofar as it addressed that motion.  Because the District 
Court has not yet passed on the merits of the parties’ 
arguments as to venue, we express no opinion on the matter 
and leave it for resolution upon remand. 
VI.  
 For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the District 
Court’s order granting Flintkote’s motion to compel 
arbitration, vacate the District Court’s order denying as moot 
19 
 
Aviva’s motion to dismiss or transfer, and remand for 
proceedings consistent with this Opinion. 
